Mines and Minerals - Implied Covenants in Oil and Gas Leases - Implied Coveneant to Further Explore by Cimino, Marilyn
Denver Law Review 
Volume 34 Issue 5 Article 9 
May 2021 
Mines and Minerals - Implied Covenants in Oil and Gas Leases - 
Implied Coveneant to Further Explore 
Marilyn Cimino 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr 
Recommended Citation 
Marilyn Cimino, Mines and Minerals - Implied Covenants in Oil and Gas Leases - Implied Coveneant to 
Further Explore, 34 Dicta 348 (1957). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more 
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
DICTA September-October, 1957
Mines and Minerals-Implied Covenants in Oil and Gas Leases-
Implied Covenant to Further Explore
By MARILYN CIMINO
Marilyn Cimino is a student at the University of Denver College of Law.
The heirs of Mary Bryson, deceased lessor of certain oil leases,
brought suit against the lessee's assignee, Willingham, to cancel his
lease on the ground that the assignee had breached the implied cove-
nant of further reasonable exploration. In the alternative, the
lessors asked that Willingham be compelled to explore further
under penalty of forfeiture. Of the four wells on the lease, only one
was producing oil and gas in very small, but paying, quantities. Evi-
dence established that new production methods clearly would pro-
duce oil from deeper sands than those reached by the present wells.
The court held: the operator had breached the covenant of further
reasonable exploration when he refused to drill under such circum-
stances as would lead a reasonable, prudent operator to drill ad-
ditional wells with fair expectation of producing oil and gas in pay-
ing quantities.
The implied covenant is nothing new to oil and gas leases.
Apparently the first case to recognize the covenant to develop after
discovering paying oil and gas was Stoddard v. Emery.1 In that 1889
decision the Pennsylvania Supreme Court announced by way of
dictum that, in the absence of an express provision to the contrary,
an implied duty arises to develop the property reasonably. Since the
Stoddard case, the doctrine of implied covenants in oil and gas
leases has become well settled.2 By its nature, the oil and gas lease
is incapable of containing provisions for all the circumstances that
may arise during its term, therefore, the usual lease form merely
excludes mention of many situations likely to arise.
Germane to this discussion are only those covenants implied in
the drilling clause of one lease. Merrill has recognized three implied
drilling obligations: (1) to drill an initial well, (2) to drill an
offset well, and (3) to drill additional wells.8 Though the first two
of these doctrines have been generally recognized and followed in
most jurisdictions, a conflict marks the third. The majority rule
divides the covenant to fit two distinct situations. The more obvious
of the two is the duty to develop proven producing territory, and,
not so obvious, but equally important-the duty to explore un-
proven territory. Unproven territory as construed most favorably
to the lessee is that containing one or perhaps more wells producing
in small, but paying, quantities. The necessity for a covenant to
explore becomes paramount after a producing well has been
developed. Then the lessee has lost his right to delay drilling by the
1 128 Pa. 436, 18 At. 339 (1889).
'See 2 Summers, Oil and Gas § 395 (Perm. ed. 1938).
3 Merrill, Covenants Implied in Oil and Gas Leases 23 (2d ed. 1940).
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payment of rentals, and the only consideration flowing to the
lessor is the payment of royalties.
While jurisdictions surrounding Texas were adhering to the
doctrine of the implied covenant to further explore, Texas held out
strongly in favor of the lessee and clearly repudiated it. The Texas
Court of Civil Appeals recognized in Waggoner Estate v. Sigler Oil
Co.4 that where the lease fails to define the lessee's duty regarding
development after discovery of paying oil and gas, the law implies
an obligation to continue drilling with reasonable diligence. The
opinion concluded, however, that the alternative decree of cancel-
lation was an improper remedy and that it would override by
judicial interpretation the intent of the parties.
In Spurlock v. Hinton5 the same court found that no such im-
plied equitable doctrine existed, and that the only remedy was an
action for damages. Texas followed these decisions,' utilizing a
variety of reasons without mentioning the implied exploration
covenant.
The United States Supreme Court case of Stauder v. Mid-
continent Petroleum Corp.- did little to sway the Texas courts. In
Stauder the court held the lessor had the duty to prove the lease
had been abandoned, or that an offset well was needed, or that a
reasonably prudent operator under similar circumstances would
have drilled a well. While there was some question of drainage in
the case, the Court based its decision chiefly on the last issue, stating
that it would be inequitable to permit the lessee to hold the un-
developed balance of land for speculation without drilling or
having any intent to drill in the near future. An alternative decree
was granted to the lessor, i.e., to drill within a specified period or
surrender the lease.
Some twenty years after the Stauder decision Texas still had
not recognized the lessee's obligation to drill additional wells after
production in paying quantities. Although in 1954, the Texas Su-
preme Court in Perkins v. Mitchell8 granted relief to the lessor, the
implied obligation of the lessee had little importance in the case.
There the lessor brought suit to cancel an oil and gas lease on the
ground that the lessee had failed to reasonably develop the property.
There was no evidence as to how long the lessee had refrained
from drilling. One expert was allowed to testify to the effect that
he would drill a well if he were in similar circumstances. A con-
ditional decree to drill an additional well or suffer cancellation was
rendered for the first time in Texas. Even though the court talked
in terms of reasonable development, the case actually turned upon
further exploration of deeper, unproven sands.9
In the principal case the primary issue was whether there is
an implied covenant to explore as distinguished from the obligation
to develop after production. By answering this question in the
4 118 Tex. 509, 19 S.W.2d 27 (1929).
s225 S.W.2d 203 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
6 Fort Worth Nat'l Bank v. McLean, 245 S.W.2d 309 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951); Senter v. Shonafelt,
233 5.W.2d 202 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950). (no proof of profitable production); Guleke v. Humble Oil &
Ref. Co., 126 S.W.2d 38 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939); Gibson v. Sheldon, 90 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. Civ. App.
1936). (action for damages proper under facts rather than equitable decree of cancellation).
7 292 U.S. 272 (1934).
8 153 Tex. 368, 268 S.W.2d 907 (1954).
. Conflicting answers to specific questions put to the iury were the issues on appeal, but the
court found that the answers could be reconciled and passed lightly over the exploration issue.
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affirmative, the Texas courts had advanced in only two years from
bare recognition' ° to complete approval of the doctrine. Just why
Texas was so tardy in applying the implied covenant to explore has
been the subject of much conjecture. One writer feels that the
willingness to wildcat the Texas fields has, perhaps, minimized
litigation by dissatisfied lessors." At any rate, the lessor may now
have his remedy in Texas.
Colorado has not yet had to pass on a case involiving precisely
the same facts. As early as 1898, however, the Colorado Supreme
Court found an implied covenant that the lessee should exercise
reasonable diligence in working a mineral lease.12 Thirty years
later in Florence Oil & Refining Co. v. Orman" a lease which
granted the lessee exclusive exploration rights was cancelled with-
out notice to the lessee by the lessor. The lessee had drilled four
wells, only one of which produced any oil and gas, and that was not
of a paying quantity. Four years after the lessee had pulled the
casings and quit the premises, a cancellation was granted on the
ground of abandonment. Since no oil and gas had been produced,
no estate had vested in the lessee. The court stated: "He (lessee)
could not be sued on an implied covenant to search, because no
covenant existed.'
14
At first glance this appears to be a direct denial by the Colo-
rado Supreme Court of an implied exploration covenant, but here
there was no prior production. The court indicated when it cited
with approval an Ohio case15 that an implied covenant to develop
arises after the lessee has discovered and produced paying oil and
gas.
From this conclusion regarding development of a leasehold
after production of paying oil and gas, it is but a short step to reach
a similar conclusion where further exploration is in issue. With oil
production and exploration on the increase in Colorado, the exist-
ance of the implied covenant to further explore will surely arise
here as an issue before too long. The influence of Willingham v.
Bryson should be heeded and followed by the Colorado courts.
'10 Perkins v. Mitchell ,153 Tex. 368, 268 S.W.2d 907 (1954).
1Meyers, The Implied Covenant of Further Exploration, 34 Tex. L. Rev. 553 (1956).
02 Colorado Fuel & Iron Corp. v. Pryor, 25 Colo. 540, 57 Poc. 51 (1898).
' 19 Colo. App. 79, 73 Pac. 628 (1903).
14 Id. at 92, Pac. at 632.
's Harris v. Ohio Oil Co., 57 Ohio St. 118, 48 N.E. 502 (1897).
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